CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOUBLE JEOPARDY-INCREASE IN SENTENCE AFTER PARTIALLY SERVED CUSTODIAL TERM VIOLATIVE OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE-State v. Ryan, 86 N.J. 1, 429 A.2d

332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981).
The guarantee of the fifth amendment articulates the intuitive
understanding that to try or to punish an individual twice for the
same offense is contrary to the dictates of civilized society., The
double jeopardy guarantee is succinctly stated and the protection it
affords is theoretically clear: no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." 2 Complex, confusing, and often contradictory judicial interpretations, however, have obscured rather than explicated
the basic provisions of the clause. 3
It is noteworthy, then, when a court abandons the theoretical
convolutions accompanying the application of the double jeopardy
protections and returns to the fundamental principles animating it.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey accomplished just that in State v.
Ryan. 4 The court considered the constitutional validity of increasing
a defendant's custodial term once service of sentence had commenced,
and held that because jeopardy attaches immediately upon the beginning of the sentence, a later increase is impermissible. 5 By so concluding, the Ryan decision focused upon the underlying safeguards
incorporated in the double jeopardy clause. 6
Edward Joseph Ryan's sentencing process began when, pursuant
to a plea bargain agreement, 7 he pleaded guilty to charges of breaking
and entering and larceny.8 On Janurary 4, 1974, he was sentenced to
concurrent terms aggregating three to five years in New Jersey State
Prison .
See Western & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 113 S. Cr. REv.
81, 81 (1978). The principles underlying the guarantee against double jeopardy are ancient.
Over 2,000 years ago Demosthenes observed that "'it]he laws forbid the same man to be tried
twice on the same issue." Id. (quoting DE.MOSTIENES 589 (Vance trans. 1962)).
U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
See Western & Drubel, supra note 1, at 82-85.
86 N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981).
Id. at 9, 429 A.2d at 336.

Id.
State v. Ryan, No. A-1429-79 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Nov. 15, 1974). The defendant
later challenged the validity of these guilty"pleas on a technicality. The superior court, appellate
division, however, affirmed the earlier proceedings as substantively, if not technically, sufficient. Id.
State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 433, 409 A.2d 821, 823-24 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332. cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981). Two indictments and one accusation
were lodged against the defendant citing him for breaking and entering with intent to steal and
three counts of larceny. Id.
State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 433, 409 A.2d 821, 824 (App. Div. 1979), revod, 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied. 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981).
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Approximately six months after he began serving his term,' 0
Ryan initiated sentence modification proceedings," petitioning the

Monmouth County court for transfer to a drug rehabilitation program.' 2 The judge who had originally sentenced Ryan granted the
motion, suspended Ryan's three to five year term, ' 3 transferred him to
a narcotics treatment center, and placed him on probation for two
4
years. 1
In February 1977, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of

probation violation and was subsequently sentenced to concurrent
terms totalling five to seven years, the statutory maximum for the
original offenses.' 5 This sentence represented a two-year increase in
Ryan's original custodial term and was the basis of Ryan's double
jeopardy arguments. Prior to appealing his sentence the defendant
was released on parole.' 6
Ryan filed an appeal addressing three points: 1) the constitutionality of the increased sentence following partial execution of the original term; 2) the impact of a sentence modification motion on resentencing; and 3) the right to sentence credit for time spent on
probation.' 7 He argued that an increase in sentence imposed subse-

1086 N.J. at 3, 429 A.2d at 333.
,1 N.J. CT. R. 3:21-10(b). Under this rule a defendant may petition the court for a modifica-

tion of the original sentence. The rule states: "A motion may be filed and an order may be
entered at any time (1) changing a custodial sentence to permit entry of the defendant into a
custodial or non-custodial treatment or rehabilitation program for drug or alcohol abuse." Id.
1286 N.J. at 3, 429 A.2d at 333.
13Brief & Appendix on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 2, State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super.
427, 409 A.2d 821 (App. Div. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Brief]. The supreme court
found that the imposition of probation resulted in a "suspension of the execution" of the original
term, "not in a vacation or annulment." 86 N.J. at 14, 429 A.2d at 338. Indeed, the initial
judicial order placing Ryan on probation provided that "the original sentence . . . be suspended." Defendant's Brief, supra, at DA 17.
86 N.J. at 3-4, 429 A.2d at 333.
's State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 433, 409 A.2d 821, 824 (App. Div. 1979). rev'd. 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981). Ryan was cited for violation of
probation because of 1) a disorderly persons conviction for growing marijuana (this conviction
was ultimately reversed for procedural defect involving proof of test used on plants. Id. at 443
n.3, 409 A.2d at 829 n.3); 2) absconding from probationary supervision, 3) leaving the state for
over 24 hours; and 4) changing residence without notifying his probation officer. Defendant's
Brief, supra note 13, at 4-5. The trial court learned that Ryan was serving 30 days for malicious
damage and larceny and facing 30 more for a contempt of court conviction. Id. at 6. Additionally, a number of detainers were lodged against Ryan, and the State of New York had initiated
extradition proceedings. Id. at 5-6.
16Brief on Behalf of the State of New Jersey at 2, State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 409
A.2d 821 (App. Div. 1979). The supreme court concluded that the defendant's appeal was not
mooted by his release on parole. 86 N.J. at 6-7 n.3, 429 A.2d at 334 n.3.
" State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 432, 409 A.2d 821, 823 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd. 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981).
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quent to partial execution of the initial custodial term was barred by

8
the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state constitutions.'
The defendant also contended that the court rule under which his
sentence was modified' 9 limits the resentencing court to the term
already pronounced and partially served. He claimed that a probation
violator whose sentence is modified can be compelled only to complete

the balance of his initial sentence.2 0
The appellate division held that an increased sentence imposed

upon revocation of probation was permissible under the double jeopardy clause. 2 ' Relying upon statutory authority, probation policy,
and precedent, the court justified the increased sentence as lawful,
22

constitutional, and warranted by the defendant's criminal record.
Judge Botter explained that courts are endowed with broad

powers in relation to probation. 23 The power granted is sufficient to
enable the court to suspend a sentence partially executed and to place

a defendant on probation.2 4 The court reasoned that the applicability of the probation revocation statute, sanctioning the imposition of
any sentence originally proper, 25 follows from these general powers.
The appellate division rejected the defendant's claim that the resentencing provisions of the probation statute did not apply because his
probation was granted pursuant to a sentence modification motion.

'8U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. The fifth amendment guarantees: "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Id. The New Jersey provision
states that "No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense." N.J. CONsT. art. 1,
para. 11. It is accepted that "[a]lthough the language of the former seems to be broader in scope
than the latter, actually in operation their boundaries are co-extensive." State v. Wolf, 46 N.J.
301, 303, 216 A.2d 586, 587 (1966).
'" See note 11 supra.
10 State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 436, 409 A.2d 821, 825 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981).
21 Id. The court found that "[d]ouble jeopardy concepts should not condemn the imposition
of a new sentence in place of the suspended sentence as part of a state's sentencing plan when a
defendant violates conditions of probation imposed on his release from prison." Id.
II Id. at 438-39, 409 A.2d at 826-27.
2' State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 438, 409 A.2d 821, 826 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981). The court referred to N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 161-1 (West 1929) (repealed 1978), which authorized a court "to suspend the imposition or
execution of sentence, and also to place the defendant on probation." Id.
2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161-1 (West 1929) (repealed 1978).
2s Id. § 2A: 168-4 provided that "the court ... may continue or revoke the probation and the
suspension of sentence, and may cause the sentence imposed to be executed or impose any
sentence which might originally have been imposed." Id. This statute was repealed after the
appellate division decided Ryan. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted, however, that the
2
provision replacing the statute was essentially similar. 86 N.J. at 6 n. , 429 A.2d at 334 n.2. The
the court revokes a
states:
"When
1981)
(West
ANN.
§
2C:45-3b
N.J.
STAT.
statute,
revised
suspension or pr9bation, it may impose on the defendant any sentence that might have been
imposed originally for the offense of which he was convicted." Id.
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The court concluded that increased sentences are, in fact, within the
26
contemplation of the pertinent probation legislation.
Ancillary to the appellate court's acceptance of the probation
violation statute27 was its rejection of New Jersey's split-sentence statute 28 as appropriate in Ryan's situation. Under this statute the defendant must complete a designated custodial term before being released
on probation. 2 The defendant argued that, by analogy, the splitsentence statute was applicable to his particular situation 30 because in
both instances the defendant is incarcerated prior to release on parole.
Significantly, an offender sentenced under this statute can only be
resentenced to the balance of the original custodial term. 31 The
appellate division concluded, however, that the split-sentence statute
is operative only in relation to sentences served in county institutions. 32 The court refused to apply the split-sentence strictures to
Ryan's state prison term, despite the apparent similarity in the nature
of the sentence. 33 Finally, the court declined to credit Ryan with the
time spent on probation. 34
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification3 5 and
subsequently reversed the appellate division. Its action was premised

"-

State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427,438-39, 409 A.2d 821, 826-27 (App. Div. 1979). rer'd.
86 N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied. 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981).
2- See note 25 supra.
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:164-16 (West 1971) (repealed 1978).
29 The split-sentence statute provided that:
In any sentence involving imprisonment in any county jail, penitentiary or workhouse the court may, as part of the sentence imposed, require the person so sentenced to serve a designated part of such sentence in the jail. penitentiary or
workhouse itself, and, thereafter, after having been given credit for days remitted, if
any, to be released on probation. . . .The court may, upon proof of such violation
or violations of any of the conditions of such probation, resentence such person to
such jail, penitentiary or workhouse for the remaining portion of the sentence
originally pronounced.
Id.
'0 State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 438, 409 A.2d 821, 826 (App. Div. 1979). rev'd. 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981).
31 See note 29 supra.
32 State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 438, 409 A.2d 821, 826 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd. 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981).
33 Id.
3 Id. at 441-42, 409 A.2d at 828. The court qualified this holding by noting that the denial

of credit was without prejudice to defendant's right to petition the trial court to grant credit for
the time spent at the rehabilitation center. Id. at 442, 409 A.2d at 828. While asserting that the
"defendant cannot demand credit for probation time as a matter of right," the appellate division
explained that the nature of the probation and the extent to which the defendant's freedom was
restricted may be sufficient to compel the court to credit Ryan's sentence for the time spent on
probation. Id.
3582 N.J. 297, 412 A.2d 802 (1980).
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primarily on the double jeopardy issue. 36 Although the court held
that the imposition of a custodial term following a revocation of

probation is permissible, 37 the majority noted that the increase of an
already commenced custodial term following probation revocation
would be unconstitutional. 38 Justice Clifford found that the increase
of a prison term following a revocation of probation is contrary to
basic double jeopardy principles as jeopardy attaches immediately
upon the commencement of the custodial term. 39 Accordingly, the
sentence becomes final upon complete or partial execution of the

term.4 0
An examination of Ryan in light of the long history of the double
jeopardy clause establishes this New Jersey case as an integral part of a
theoretical progression apparent in federal and state cases. Preserved
by the traditions of colonial America, 41 codified in the fifth amendment, and eventually extended to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, 42 the double jeopardy clause has assumed a number of
roles. It has been variously defined as "central to the objective of the
prohibition against successive trials," 43 essential to the preservation of
the "finality" 44 or "integrity" 45 of judgments, and necessary to the
maintenance of "the defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal." 46 "The terms of the double jeopardy
clause are not self-defining," 47 and the plethora of decisions interpret-

ing it is complex and confusing.48 Thus, it is essential to identify, at

86 N.J. at 6, 429 A.2d at 334. The supreme court agreed with the lower court's resolution
and reasoning in the denial of sentence credit for time spent on probation and the applicability of
the split-sentence statute, see note 29 supra, to sentence modification proceedings. 86 N.J. at 6,
429 A.2d at 334.
-1 86 N.J. at 8, 429 A.2d at 335.
3, Id. at 9, 429 A.2d at 335-36.
3v Id.
40 Id.
1' See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980). See also Note, The Supreme
Court's Treatment of the Defendant's Double Jeopardy Interests in the 1977 Term, 48 U. CIN.
L. REv. 517, 520 (1979).
4 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978). The Court in Burks defined double jeopardy
as the guarantee protecting the defendant from repeated attempts to prosecute. Id.
'4 Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978).
4 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978).
4 Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684,
689 (1949)).
17 Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
CriminalSentences, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1001 (1980).
"' United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). The "historical purposes of the Double jeopardy Clause are necessarily general in nature, and their application has come to abound in often
subtle distinctions." Id. at 87.
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animate this "fundamenleast briefly, the enduring principles which
' 49
tal ideal of our constitutional heritage."
A distillation of the opinions interpreting the clause reveals two
basic principles. 50 It is firmly established that an acquittal based on a
jury verdict or a legal ruling is an absolute bar to retrial, 5 1 Equally
well-established is the fact that following the defendant's successful
appeal of conviction, based on anything other than the insufficiency

of the evidence, the prosecution is free to retry the defendant. 5 The
double jeopardy principles associated with punishment and sentencing and which are most significant to convicted defendants, however,
are less certain.'
In Ex parte Lange, 53 the seminal case in this area, the trial court
imposed upon the defendant both a $200 fine and a one year prison
term.5 The statute under which the defendant was sentenced, however, provided for fine or imprisonment.5 5 After the petitioner had
paid the fine and served five days in prison, the original sentencing
judge discovered the mistake, vacated the original sentence, and resentenced the defendant to a one year term. 58 Following this procedure, the defendant's punishment consisted of a fine as well as a one
year and five day jail sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the lower

court's resentencing of the petitioner, concluding that it would have
resulted in double punishment in violation of the fifth amendment. 57
The court in Lange realistically assessed the double jeopardy guarantee, noting: "Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being found

guilty a second time. It is the punishment that would legally follow
the second conviction which is the real danger." 5 8

4'Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The double jeopardy protections are
deeply rooted in common law and derive from common law pleas of autrefois acquit, autrefois
convict, and pardon. Id. The purpose of these pleadings was to insulate those previously
acquitted, convicted, or pardoned from further judicial proceedings. See Westen & Drubel,
supra note 1, at 85. See generally United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980); Ex
parte Lange, 85 U.S. 168, 169 (1873).
w United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1978).
5, Id. at 90.
51 Id. The Court in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 (1978), described these concepts as
"two venerable principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence."
53 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
54 Id. at 164.
ss Id.
56 Id.
51 Id. at 175. The Court asked: "For of what avail is the constitutional protection against
more than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict?
Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can never be tried again for that
offense?" Id. at 173.
1 Id. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975). "When a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he
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The application of double jeopardy principles to resentencing
was again considered by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Benz. 59 The Court held that the judiciary had the power to reduce
sentence but acknowledged, in dictum, that a sentence could not be
later increased. 60 The Benz Court relied on Lange and concluded
that an increase in a sentence already partially served is constitutionally invalid. 6'
The United States Supreme Court considered resentencing in a
slightly different context in North Carolina v. Pearce.12 In Pearce,
the Court upheld a more stringent sentence imposed following a
retrial. 3 The Court explained that the power to retry implied the
power to resentence the defendant to any term permissible under the
applicable statute for the initial crime. 64 This power derived from
the fact that the retrial and reconviction functioned to nullify and
void the original sentence. 65 With the sentencing "slate wiped
clean," 661 the second court is, in effect, writing upon a tabula rasa and
is free to exercise its sentencing authority.
Most recently the Supreme Court examined the basic tenets of
Lange and its progeny in United States v. DiFrancesco.6 7 In DiFrancesco, the Court examined the ramifications of the Dangerous Special
Offenders Act 6 8 in light of the defendant's constitutional protections
against double jeopardy. With this Act Congress provided for governmental appeal and sentence increase for terms considered to be too
lenient. 6 The central question examined by the Supreme Court was
"whether a criminal sentence, once pronounced, was to be accorded
constitutional finality and conclusiveness similar to that which attaches to a jury's verdict of acquittal."7 v0 Unable to analogize sentencing with acquittal, the Supreme Court held that an increased sentence
not be subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the
same offense." Id. at 343.
- 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
60 Id. at 307. The majority opinion explained that the increase in sentence would "subject the
defendant to double punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
01 Id.

395 U.S. 711 (1969).
61Id. at 719.
8" Id. at 720. The Supreme Court stated that "a corollary of the power to retry a defendant is
the power, upon the defendant's reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be legally
authorized, whether or not it is greater than the sentence imposed after the first conviction." Id.
s Id. at 720-21.
62

"
8,

Id. at 721.
449 U.S. 117 (1980).

18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976).
69
70

U.

449 U.S. at 132.
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under the dangerous special offenders statute was permissible. 7'

The

DiFrancesco opinion limited the applicability of Lange and Benz,
concluding that those cases prohibited an increased term only when it
exceeds the limit on sentence imposed by statute.7a

In addition to considering the constitutionality of an increased
term following partial execution of sentence, the Supreme Court has

also addressed the problem of resentencing after probation revocation. In Roberts v. United States,7 3 the Court analyzed the federal
Probation Act 7 4 and held that probation and subsequent revocation

did not eliminate the initial sentence but merely suspended it. 75 The
Court explained that the statute provided for two alternatives: 1)
suspension of execution of a declared term; or 2) suspension of imposition of any term whatsoever. 76 Under the first alternative, the resentencing court would be bound by the original sentence. Under the

second, the court would be free to impose any sentence that could
originally have been imposed. 77 The Court held that "having exercised its discretion by sentencing an offender to a definite term of
imprisonment in advance of probation, a court may not later, upon
revocation of probation, set aside that sentence and increase the term
of imprisonment." ' 78 This understanding was eventually codified in
the 1948 revision of the probation statute. 79 On the federal level,

71 Id. at 133. "There are, furthermore, fundamental distinctions between a sentence and an
acquittal, and to fail to recognize them is to ignore the particular significance of an acquittal."
Id.
72 Id. at 139. For further discussion of this problem, see notes 137-45 infra.
73 320 U.S. 264 (1943).
74 18 U.S.C. §§ 724-28 (1940), as amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1948). The statute
originally provided that upon revocation of probation "the court may revoke the probation or
suspension of sentence, and may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 725 (1940).
Is 320 U.S. at 267.
16 Id. at 268.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 272-73. See also Note, Sentencing Upon Revocation of Probation in Florida. 30 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1063 (1976).
79 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1948) provides:
As speedily as possible after arrest the probationer shall be taken before the
court.... Thereupon the court may revoke the probation and require him to serve
the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence, and, if imposition of sentence was
suspended, may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.
Id. In United States v. Lancer, 508 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1975), the court explained that "'[u]nder
the terms of the statute, the district court could revoke [the defendant's probation] . . . and
require him either to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence." Id. at 726. See generally
United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126
(1st Cir. 1977); Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1975).
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then, the actual declaration of sentence is the central and controlling
event.

The New Jersey courts have consistently upheld the imposition of
an increased term after probation has been revoked.8 0 In 1955 the
New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the sentence following a
probation violation is "a new sentence caused by the act of the defendant involving probation." 8' The original sentence, then, is expunged

and no longer binding.

2

This rationale was adopted in State v. Cunningham.8 3 The

defendant in Cunningham, pursuant to a sentence modification motion, had been released on probation following partial service of a
given term.8 4 The appellate division upheld the imposition of the
more severe sentence reasoning that "although jeopardy attaches at
the beginning of execution of sentence. . . the higher second sentence
• . . is not a second jeopardy attaching for the original crime. The
second sentence is imposed for violation of the terms of probation."8 51
Cunningham, then, avoided the double jeopardy implications of more

severe sentencing by describing the increased term as punishment for
the probation violation rather than for the initial criminal activity.
It was from this milieu that the novel question posed in State v.
Ryan emerged. Indeed, an understanding of this background material

0 In In re White, 18 N.J. 449, 114 A.2d 261 (1955), the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected
the rationale of Roberts. The court explained that the Roberts decision resulted from the federal
statutes failure to specifically provide for a revocation of the suspended sentence which, in turn,
precluded an imposition of a second sentence. Id. at 454, 114 A.2d at 263. The New Jersey court
first stated that it was not bound by the Supreme Court in determining the meaning of state
statutes. Id. at 453, 114 A.2d at 264. The White decision concluded that under New Jersey law,
the power to revoke the original sentence is implicit in the statute. "-[T]he Legislature clearly
meant that the statute is applicable to a situation where the original sentencing judge actually
imposed a sentence." Id. at 454, 114 A.2d at 264. A number of cases have followed the rationale
set forth in White. See, e.g., State v. Cunningham, 143 N.J. Super. 415, 363 A.2d 369 (App.
Div. 1976); State v. Braeuning, 135 N.J. Super. 89, 342 A.2d 596 (Law Div. 1975), modified on
other grounds, 140 N.J. Super. 245, 356 A.2d 33 (App. Div. 1976); State v. Fisher, 115 N.J.
Super. 373, 279 A.2d 885 (App. Div. 1971); State v. Pallitto, 107 N.J. Super. 96, 257 A.2d 121
(App. Div. 1969), certif. denied, 55 N.J. 309, 261 A.2d 354 (1970); State v. Driesse, 95 N.J.
Super. 491, 231 A.2d 835 (App. Div. 1967). It is important to note that with the exception of
Cunningham, none of the defendants in these cases had commenced service of a custodial term.
*' In re White, 18 N.J. 449, 456, 114 A.2d 261, 265 (1955).
- State v. Pallitto, 107 N.J. Super. 96, 100, 257 A.2d 121, 12,3 (App. Div. 1969), certif.
denied, 55 N.J. 309 (1970). The utility of this argument in avoiding double jeopardy problems is
obvious. By defining the new sentence as a separate sentence, a court is able to increase the
defendant's initial term to any term that may have been imposed regardless of the strictures of
the double jeopardy clause.
143 N.J. Super. 415, 363 A.2d 371 (App. Div. 1976).
iId. at 416, 363 A.2d at 372.
*s Id. at 417, 363 A.2d at 373 (citation omitted).
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highlights Ryan as a significant development in the evolution of the
double jeopardy clause. The confluence of such factors as the partially
served term, the sentence modification procedures, the revocation of
probation, and the greater sentence ultimately imposed tests the guarantees of the fifth amendment in a unique way. Over a decade ago,
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in dictum that serious double
jeopardy problems would result from increasing a partially served
sentence. 88 Ryan confronts just these serious problems.
The United States Supreme Court in DiFrancescoreserved judgment on this issueA7 The DiFrancesco Court considered whether
sentence, once pronounced, was entitled to constitutional finality. 88
Justice Clifford placed the issue in Ryan in juxtaposition to that in
DiFrancescoby asking whether a sentence, once commenced, is entitled to constitutional finality. 89 Thus, the stage was set for the New
Jersey Supreme Court's consideration of Ryan.
The Ryan court's decision analyzed the statute which governed
the procedure following a probation violation and identified the three
options it presented. 0 Under that statute a probation violator could
be allowed to continue with the probation, or, if both the probation
and accompanying suspension of sentence were revoked, to complete
the term imposed or to serve any term which might have originally
been imposed for the underlying crime.9 The court concurred with
the appellate division finding that the statute authorizing the resentencing was applicable to probationary terms granted pursuant to a
sentence modification motion. 2 It concluded, however, that if the
defendant has been imprisoned prior to probation he can be compelled only to complete the given term. 3 Nevertheless, the defendant
State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 501, 231 A.2d 369, 375 (1967).
8 449 U.S. at 134. The DiFrancescoCourt observed that:
[O]ur Double Jeopardy Clause was drafted with the common law protections in
mind... . This accounts for the established practice in the federal courts that the
sentencing judge may recall the defendant and increase his sentence, at least (and we
venture no comment as to this limitation) so long as he has not yet begun to serve
that sentence.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Schreiber, dissenting in Ryan, suggested that the United States
Supreme Court had refrained only from commenting on those situations in which the defendant
was free on bail prior to increasing an erroneously imposed sentence. He criticized the majority's
reading of the phrase as improperly broad and not applicable to Ryan's situation. 86 N.J. at 15
n.1, 429 A.2d at 339 n.1. (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
8 449 U.S. at 132.
8186 N.J. at 9-10, 429 A.2d at 336.
Id. at 7, 429 A.2d at 334-35.
91 Id.
02 Id. at 6, 429 A.2d at 334.
93 Id. at 12, 429 A.2d at 337.
h6
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whose sentence has been suspended pending probation can be resentenced to the statutory maximum.9 4 The court "acknowledged the
absence of perfect symmetry" ° between the tvo closely allied situations but justified the prohibition against the imposition of an increased term as the "price of vindication of a defendant's right not to
be put in double jeopardy."9 "
In considering the impact of the probation violation statute on
resentencing after partial service, the court confronted the appellate
division's reliance on State v. Cunningham.9 7 Justice Clifford, while
98
noting that Cunningham was factually indistinguishable from Ryan,
nonetheless rejected that court's reasoning which ascribed the increase
in sentence to the violation of probation. 9 The supreme court in
Ryan explained that the original criminal activity, not the failure to
observe the conditions of probation, is the correct focus of the subsequent sentencing procedure. 100 By defining the more severe sentence
in terms of the original rather than probation offense, the court
0
overruled Cunningham.°'
The court similarly disposed of the other
arguments adduced in Cunningham in support of the greater sentence. The Cunningham court warned that to limit the judge's sentencing discretion to the original term would have a "chilling effect"
on the court's willingness to impose probation. 0 2 Justice Clifford
doubted the actual validity of this prediction and discounted the
weight of such reliance when balanced against the threat to the
defendant's constitutional rights.103
The supreme court dismissed the other arguments of the appellate division which, in addition to Cunningham, relied on North
0 4
In Pearce, the court authorized an increase in
Carolinav. Pearce.1
sentence on retrial, 0 5 explaining that the imposition of the original

04

Id.

95 Id.

" Id. at 13, 429 A.2d at 338.
143 N.J. Super. 415, 363 A.2d 369 (App. Div. 1976).
86 N.J. at 11, 429 A.2d at 337.
143 N.J. Super. at 417, 429 A.2d at 337.
10086 N.J. at 8, 429 A.2d at 335. The Ryan court justified its position by noting: -'This is borne
out by the statute's [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:168-4 (West 1971) (repealed 1978))] limitation on the
sentence that follows a violation probation to the sentence already imposed or one that might
originally have been imposed, thereby anchoring the proceedings to the original offense." Id.
10186 N.J. at 13, 429 A.2d at 338.
102

143 N.J. at 418, 363 A.2d at 373.

10386 N.J. at 12-13, 429 A.2d at 338.
104395 U.S. 711 (1969).
303 Id. at 720.
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sentence could be considered in later resentencing the defendant.10
The appellate division applied this rationale to Ryan's situation and
justified the more severe term as a punishment for the defendant's
failure to conform to the conditions of his probation. 0 7 Having
dismissed the probation violations as the basis for the enhanced sentence, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ryan rejected this
interpretation. 08 In further distinguishing Pearce, Justice Clifford
discussed the disposition of the original sentence. The United States
Supreme Court in Pearcefound that retrial functioned to render the
original sentence void. 0 9 In Ryan, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court characterized the original sentence as temporarily inoperative rather than void.",0
Similarly, the majority rejected the dissent's reliance on DiFrancesco."' An important facet of the DiFrancescoopinion is the Supreme Court's belief that because of the existence of the Dangerous
Special Offender's Act the defendant was on notice that his sentence
could be appealed and possibly increased.1 2 The court distinguished
Ryan from DiFrancesco, concluding that Ryan "had no reason to
expect that his original sentence was not final at the time it was
imposed and his imprisonment began." " 3 The court stated that Ryan
could fairly anticipate only that the beneficial treatment accorded
him pursuant to the sentence modification motion would be revoked
4
and the original sentence reinstated."

The court devoted the bulk of the opinon in Ryan to distinguishing it from precedent relied upon by the dissenting opinon and the
appellate division. Ryan is important, however, not because it is
different or distinguishable, but rather because it is the next step in a
continuing tradition of interpretation evidenced in the decisions analyzing the double jeopardy safeguards of the fifth amendment.

1o Id. at 723. By associating the increased term with cognizable behavior the Pearce court
attempted to insure that the new sentence was imposed for cause rather than out of judicial
vindictiveness for bringing the appeal. Id. at 724.
107 State v. Ryan, 171 N.J. Super. 427, 436, 409 A.2d 821, 825 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd. 86
N.J. 1, 429 A.2d 332, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 363 (1981). "By analogy, a sentence imposed after
probation has been violated can reflect the added basis for evaluating defendant's amenability to
reform, namely, his response to probation." Id.
10386 N.J. at 8, 429 A.2d at 335.
109395 U.S. at 721.

110 86 N.J. at 14,429 A.2d at 338. The sentence modification "resulted only in a suspension of
the execution of [Ryan's] original sentence." Id. at 13, 429 A.2d at 338.
M Id. at 14-19, 429 A.2d at 338-41 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
"1
13

114

449 U.S. at 137.

86 N.J. at 10, 429 A.2d at 336.

Id.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court's labored efforts to differentiate
Ryan from recent opinions on the double jeopardy clause obscures the

real and determinative point of the decision. The court succinctly
stated that the sentence imposed pursuant to a violation of probation
is part of the original sentence. The second sentence, then, is not a
punishment for the probation violation itself.' 1 5 Having so identified
the new sentence, the court logically concluded that since jeopardy
had attached upon commencement of the term, "1 6 the possibility of an
increased sentence was foreclosed by the mandates of the double
jeopardy clause." 7 The holding of the court is simply stated: the
double jeopardy clause forbids an increase in sentence once the defendant has partially executed the given custodial term. The double
jeopardy problem in Ryan was solved by the court's perception of the
increased sentence as an integral element of the initial sentence.
By denying the applicability of the probation violations as the
basis for the new sentence, the court eviscerated the complexities of

the case, and reduced it to a simple scenario."

8

The fundamental

question posed was whether a defendant could be put in jail, released
on probation, and ultimately returned for a greater term. Phrased in

such a manner, the answer is obvious. The possibility of the state's
uninhibited power to manipulate the defendant's sentence would be a
patent violation of basic double jeopardy safeguards." 9
The court, in reversing Cunningham, explicitly discredited the

rationale of that case and rejected the concept that the more severe
term is given for the probation violation and is "not a second or
additional punishment for the original crime."120 The Cunningham

"'
Id. at 8, 429 A.2d at 335. "[Tlhe sentence imposed after revocation of probation should be
viewed as focusing on the original offense rather than on the violation of probation as a separate
offense." Id.
116 Id. at 9, 409 A.2d at 336. See State v. Laird, 25 N.J. 298, 135 A.2d 859 (1957): State v.
Cunningham, 143 N.J. Super. 415, 363 A.2d 369 (App. Div. 1976). See also United States v.
Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 168 (1874).
M186 N.J. at 9, 409 A.2d at 336.
Id. at 8, 12, 420 A.2d at 335, 337.
ItO There is no basis for increasing sentence after a probation violation. First. to impose a
greater sentence after such a violation would ultimately result in punishing the defendant for
leaving the state without permission, failing to report to the probation officer, or transgressing
some other condition imposed on probation. Although the probation environment is an artificial
one that renders such seemingly unimportant actions more significant, it is not so contrived as to
render such behavior criminal. Indeed, the interests of society in censoring the recreant probationer are high, however, the reimposition of the original term would satisfy this concern.
Second, any criminal activity which precipitates the revocation of probation will be punished
separately.
1:0143 N.J. Super. at 417, 363 A.2d at 373. The dissenting opinion in State v. Jones, 327 So.2d
18 (Fla. 1976) (Boyd, J., dissenting), adopted the same rationale, concluding: "the court ex-
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court made a clear distinction between the sentences and thereby
avoided the problem of double punishment for a single offense. Conversely, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ryan reasoned that although the new term is imposed "because of the defendant's failure to
abide by the conditions of his probation," it is emphatically "not for
the violation of those conditions."' 2' Justice Clifford, by readjusting
the court's approach to sentencing subsequent to probation violation,
revealed the constitutional invalidity of increasing a sentence following partial execution. 122 It is clear that the court's opinion is more
closely related to the federal interpretation of the federal probation
statute articulated in Roberts than it is to the earlier state court
opinions culminating in Cunningham.
The court's analysis of the original sentence is similarly dispositive. The New Jersey court clearly differentiated Ryan from Pearce in
relation to the disposition of the term initially imposed. 2 3 The court
suggested that the retrial situation in Pearce is unique and distinct
from the sentence modification procedures implicated in Ryan. In the
former, the defendant had challenged the initial conviction and subsequent sentence. 24 As a result, the sentence first imposed was set aside
on appeal and the sentencing slate "wiped clean."' 125 In Ryan's situa-

tion, however, the initial term was never specifically revoked. As the
New Jersey court explained, this sentence was modified and sus26
pended.
ceeded its statutory authority by imposing a new and different sentence from the [one] previously imposed." Id. at 26 (Boyd, J., dissenting). The majority opinion, however, affirmed the
increased term. The circumstances presented in Jones are essentially the same as in Ryan. The
decision, however, is merely an exercise in statutory interpretation. The Florida court construed
the applicable split-sentence statute as providing that the defendant could be resentenced to a
greater term. The court concluded that the sentence imposed pursuant to the statute was not
conclusive and binding. Rather, it was a condition of probation subject to change. Id. at 25
(Boyd, J., dissenting). Jones, then, presents yet another rationale for an increased term. By
characterizing the initial term as temporary the court provides for later modification free from
double jeopardy concerns. If the first sentence is not the total sentence there is no constitutional
infirmity in later increasing it. New Jersey statutes do not lend themselves to a similar interpretation. Indeed, Jones would appear to have little applicability outside of Florida. See Note,
Sentencing Upon Revocation of Probation in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 1063 (1976), for
criticism of Jones.
221 86 N.J. at 8, 429 A.2d at 335 (emphasis in original). The same conclusion was reached,
albeit under slightly different circumstances, in Hall v. Bostic, 529 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 (1976). In denying the petitioner credit for the time spent on
probation, the court held that "the validity of [the defendant's) sentence thus is to be measured
by the crime for which it was imposed . . . and not by the numerous derelictions that induced
the state court to revoke his probation." Id. at 992.
21286 N.J. at 9, 429 A.2d at 336.
123 Id. at 13, 429 A.2d at 338.
12, 395 U.S. at 713.
125Id. at 721.
126 86 N.J. at 13, 429 A.2d at 338.
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Justice Clifford further declined to interpret the governing probation statutes as putting a defendant on notice that his sentence is

subject to increase. 2 7 It is important to note that the court qualified
this interpretation by specifying that finality would be accorded "at
the time [the sentence] was imposed and, [the defendant's] imprisonment began." 28 The court suggested that the probation statutes do
in fact alert the defendant to the possibility that a suspended sentence

may be increased upon revocation of probation. 29 An increase in
such a situation is permissible. 3 ' The court, however, concluded
that the beginning of service of a custodial term 3functions to preclude
the later imposition of a more severe sentence.' '
The distinction between these cases is significant in evaluating
the defendant's expectations in relation to his sentence. Because the
original sentence was never eradicated or invalidated, Ryan had every

right to expect that upon revocation he would be subject to the
remainder of the suspended term, not an increased one. 32 Justice
Schreiber suggested an alternative approach to an analysis of the
defendant's expectation. He explained that the resolution of the issue
was a factual one, premising his position on principles of "fundamental fairness or due process.'"133 Although he concluded that the probation revocation statute provided the defendant with the requisite

notice, 34 he reasoned that Ryan nonetheless may have been justified
in believing the original sentence would be reinstated.3 5 Justice

127 Id. at 10, 429 A.2d at 336.
128 Id.
12 Id. at 7-8, 429 A.2d at 334-35. The court observed that in situations in which the

defendant's original term was suspended: -Imposing the maximum sentence for the original
offense after revocation of probation without grand jury indictment or trial by jury is not
unconstitutional, since the new sentence is only a sanction for defendant's original offense for
which he had been properly tried."' Id. at 8, 429 A.2d at 335 (quoting R. KNOWLTON & D.
COBLIN, NEw JERSEY CRIMINAL PRAcTicE § 24.11 (1976)).
Io at 7, 429 A.2d at 334.
Id.
1' Id. at 9, 429 A.2d at 336.
Id. at 10, 429 A.2d at 336. The notice concept was a central point in Williams v.
I32
Wainwright, 650 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1981). There, the circuit court of appeals affirmed the
applicability of the Florida statutes which authorized the imposition of any sentence originally
proper upon revocation of probation in situations where the defendant had partially completed
his term. Id. at 60-61. An important factor in the case appeared to be the fact that the defendant
was specifically made aware of the possibility of increase and acquiesced to it as a condition of
his probation. Id. at 61-62.
13386 N.J. at 18, 429 A.2d at 341 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
"'
Id. at 17, 429 A.2d at 340 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
'I'
Id. at 18, 429 A.2d at 341 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice Schreiber specifically referred
to the standard probation form which Ryan had signed. It states: "-If you fail to observe the
conditions of your probation you may be returned to court and required to serve your sentence in
an institution."' Id. (quoting form). The dissenting opinion further indicated that upon the
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Schreiber, therefore, created an opportunity for a defendant to avoid
an increased term even if notice is given by the pertinent statute.
At the very least, the defendant can expect that upon revocation
of probation the new term imposed will not exceed the statutory
maximum for the underlying offense.13 6 This protection is a slight
one if on revocation of probation the defendant, who has already
served time, can be sentenced to a more severe term. This tactic
would render the original sentencing procedure little more than a
meaningless gesture when the original term was less than the maximum term. Clearly, such a scheme would emasculate the initial sentencing action.
The notion of finality can be traced to Lange. Admittedly, the
Lange decision is ambiguous. The two operative factual considerations-the excessive sentence and the consequent resentencing-so
profoundly complicate the court's holding that it cannot be said with
any certainty what exactly was proscribed.' 7 Nevertheless, the language of the opinion is sufficiently persuasive to support the contention that the beginning of the custodial term precludes later increase.
In Lange, the court questioned the validity of imposing a second
sentence without considering what had been accomplished under the
original. 38 "To do so is to punish him twice for the same offense." 39 The court expressly stated that once the sentence has been
executed the defendant cannot thereafter be resentenced. 40 It is not
clear whether the court contemplated total or partial execution. It is
submitted that for purposes of double jeopardy there is little if any
4
difference between the two.' '

The Supreme Court in DiFrancescochallenged the general validity of Lange and Benz.4 4 This limitation has grave implications for
sentence modification motion, the trial court failed to explain the result that a revocation of
probation would have on the defendant's original term. Id.
136See note 25 supra.
'37 See Westen, supra note 47, at 1049-50. In this article the author explains the various
interpretations of Lange. The sentence may be excessive because it is greater than the statutory
maximum. Or, disregarding the payment of the fine, the imposition of a one-year prison term
after the defendant had already served five days would result in those five days being served
twice, thereby constituting a double punishment. Id.

85 U.S. at 175.
140

I3 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.

282 U.S. at 304.
449 U.S. at 139. The Court suggested that Lange is valid only in those situations in which
the sentencing judge had imposed a term greater than that contemplated by the applicable
statute. Id. Further, the DiFrancescoCourt also stated, in dictum, that the beginning of service
of sentence is irrelevant in a consideration of increased sentence on government appeal under the
Dangerous Special Offenders Act. Id. Initially, however, the Court refused to consider whether
"1
112
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double jeopardy jurisprudence. First, it threatens to topple the entire
double jeopardy structure. By restricting the holding in Lange, the
Court, in effect, expanded the power of the sentencing authority to
modify given and possibly partially or totally executed sentences.
DiFrancesco'scriticism distorts the vision of a vast number of cases
that have adhered to the Lange-Benz rule as a basic tenet of the fifth
amendment. The Supreme Court's minimization of the defendant's
interest in finality deserves greater probity than the summary treatment given it in DiFrancesco.43 Second, the relinquishment of this
concept affords the judiciary unfettered authority to change sentences. It should be noted that DiFrancesco is a narrow opinion
concerned primarily with government appeals of sentences under the
Dangerous Special Offenders Act. 44 The circumstances presented
and the legislation involved is far different from the situation and
statute involved in the Ryan case. For this reason, the applicability of
DiFrancesco to Ryan is questionable. Additionally, the New Jersey
Supreme Court was ultimately concerned with the interpretation of a
state statute. Generally, this is the sole province of the state judiciary.

45

Judicial interpretations of the sentence modification rule supports the Ryan court's holding.

46

The fact that Ryan's sentence was

increased pursuant to a sentence modification motion does little to
justify a more severe term. The rule is narrowly written and has been
narrowly construed to allow for reduction and modification.

47

Sig-

nificantly, a sentence increase is not explicitly sanctioned by the court
rule. 48 Arguably, the word "change" may be understood to mean

the judiciary had the power to increase sentence once the term had begun. Id. at 134. Thus, it
appears that the observations of the Court are limited to the problems posed by increased
sentences under the Dangerous Special Offenders Act. The broad applicability of the Court's
conclusion is questionable.
449 U.S. at 138-39.
', Id. at 139-40.
"1 In interpreting the Florida probation statutes,
the Fifth Circuit in Williams v.
Wainwright, 650 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1981), observed that "[q]uestions of interpretation of state
statutes are within the special authority of the state supreme court." Id. at 61.
"I' State v. Williams, 81 N.J. 498, 410 A.2d 251 (1980); State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 231
A.2d 369 (1967); State v. Laird, 25 N.J. 298, 135 A.2d 859 (1957); State v. Pratts, 145 N.J.
Super. 79, 366 A.2d 1327 (App. Div. 1975), aff'd. 71 N.J. 399, 365 A.2d 928 (1975): State ex rel.
C.B., 163 N.J. Super. 215, 394 A.2d 414 (Bergen County Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1978).
I"' State v. Williams, 81 N.J. 499, 410 A.2d 251 (1980). The court held that a criminal
sentence, while it may be reduced or corrected for legal and clerical errors pursuant to N.J. CT.
R. 3:21-10, cannot be modified so as to impose a new and different sentence increasing the
defendant's punishment.
"'
State v. Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 231 A.2d 369 (1967).
We read this language to sanction reconsidered leniency and not severity. The word
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"increase." Because the term is ambiguous, courts are well advised to
avoid straining the statutory fabric by forcing an increase within the
purview of "change."'' 49 The same policies that preclude an increase
in term immediately upon a sentence modification motion should
apply to increases imposed at a more remote point. If a court cannot
increase sentence when a defendant moves for sentence modification,
it is unreasonable to allow it to do so during the course of the modified
term. This argument is particularly persuasive in that Ryan is not
being punished separately for his probation violations. The imposition
of a greater term for the defendant's behavior during the course of the
modified sentence is a denial of the benevolent purpose of the sentence
modification rule. The same guidelines that prevent the court from
increasing a sentence in a modification action should be applied in
any later proceeding relating to the defendant's modified term.
Further support for the court's holding may be adduced from the
provisions of the split-sentence statute. 50 The significance of this
statute is that it clearly provides that upon revocation of probation the
defendant may be compelled to complete only the unserved portion of
the original term. The imposition of an increased sentence would be
invalid; however, the split-sentencing alternative is available only to
defendants incarcerated in county institutions.' 5' The major distinction between this statute and the probation violation statute is that
under the latter the defendant may be sentenced to any term originally permissible. 5 2 The vastly different sentencing schemes seem to

be irreconcilable. Since the factual situation contemplated by the

"'reduce'"obviously points to this interpretation; the word "change" seems directed
only to differences in kind and not degree . . . the omission of express authority to
increase sentences in the context of the rule is highly significant. We conclude that
this language does not authorize a trial judge to increase a sentence previously
imposed by him.
Id. at 501, 231 A.2d at 374.
149 See Westen, supra note 47.
Indeed, each of these constitutional doctrines . . the rebuttable presumption
against double punishment, the prohibition of vague criminal statutes, and the
canon of narrow construction for criminal statutes are all part of the more general
principle that no one should be criminally punished except for conduct clearly
prohibited . . . when in doubt, a court should construe criminal statutes so as to
avoid the risk of punishing a person for conduct the legislature has not proscribed.
Id. at 1029-30 (footnotes omitted).
" See note 29 supra.
151State v. McCue, 148 N.J. Super. 425, 372 A.2d 1127 (App. Div. 1977); State v. Pietrowski,
136 N.J. Super. 383, 346 A.2d 427 (App. Div. 1975); State v. Fisher, 115 N.J. Super. 373, 279
A.2d 885 (App. Div. 1971).
152 86 N.J. at 12, 429 A.2d at 337.
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split-sentence provision is so analogous to that of Ryan, it would be

incongruous that the same considerations would not adhere.
It is interesting to note the disposition of parole violators under
the new criminal code. 53 Upon revocation of parole, the sentencing
limit is determined by the original term imposed.15 4 The reason for
applying a different standard to probation violators is, at best, inexplicable. There appears to be no sensible reason for treating the two
situations in such a disparate fashion.
In the final analysis it is apparent that had Ryan's more severe

term been maintained by the New Jersey Supreme Court, he would
have been punished twice for the same crime. The first sentence was
given for the breaking and entering and larceny convictions. Given
the court's rejection of the probationary violation as the basis for the

second sentence, the increase was similarly imposed for the initial

criminal behavior. 55 Broken down in this manner it is apparent that
Ryan was sentenced twice; first for three years, then for two more
years. 56 The constitutional invalidity of this is clear. "If there is
anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is
that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offense." 57
In conclusion, the significance of Ryan may be best understood in

the context of the double jeopardy framework constructed by the state
and federal courts. The history of double jeopardy is a long and
tortuous one of realignments, readjustments, and reevaluations."
These shifting interpretations, while enlarging the body of double
jeopardy principles, have done little to clarify the basic concepts. 59

IS N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-9(c) (West 1981) states: "-If an offender is recommitted upon
revocation of his parole, the term of further imprisonment . . .shall not exceed the original
sentence determined from the date of conviction."

154

Id.

M"86 N.J. at 8, 429 A.2d at 335.
"1 State v. Williams, 167 N.J. Super. 203, 400 A.2d 796 (App. Div. 1979). Williams provides
support for this analysis. As in Ryan. the defendant was placed on probation following partial
execution of a given term. The probation, however, was illegally imposed and upon its withdrawal the defendant motioned to have the time spent on probation credited to his term. Id. at
205-07. The court held that the probation was a sentence in itself and granted the defendant's
motion. Id. at 208. Williams is based on the premise that the imposition of the second sentence
during the course of the first sentence is violative of the double jeopardy clause. Id. The refusal
to credit "would be to impermissibly increase his sentence previously imposed, thus violating his
basic Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy." Id. The court concluded that the
probationary period was a new and different term, "substantially increasing the original penalty." Id. at 209.
"

85 U.S. at 168.

Westen & Drubel, supra note 1, at 82-83.
W
I at 84.
ld.
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Ryan is unique in that in such a kaleidoscopic area it sets a clearly
cognizable boundary. By establishing the commencement of sentence
as the determinate and finalizing component in the sentencing
process, the supreme court defined the point beyond which the New
Jersey judiciary cannot venture in resentencing.
Lisa Murtha

